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INTRODUCTION 
The activities of state-related pools of capital need to be understood 
within the context of an era of globalization, in which economic and po-
litical ties between many jurisdictions are deepening. This increasing 
economic interdependence between countries also results in jurisdictions 
increasingly mediating rather than controlling the interests of business 
that may be conducted within their spheres of influence.
1
 One significant 
effect of globalization has been to further elevate deficits and surpluses 
run by countries and the subsequent macroeconomic trade imbalances 
that they bring. As ever with international trade, the political context re-
mains crucial, and almost inevitably, it is intertwined with expectations 
regarding vested interests. These developments are affecting the sover-
eignty of jurisdictions as local political priorities become more inter-
twined with international politics and the requirements of international 
business. The regulatory world reflects the realities of those domains it 
purports to influence, and so a major consequence of these developments 
is that regulatory structures and processes have become more interna-
tionalized. A variety of modes of governance are emerging that have a 
capacity for impacts of broad international scope. This political reality 
interacts with how state-related pools of capital have been increasing in 
recent years, not only in their number, but also in the scale of their effect. 
The rising influence of more proactive state-led capitalism is one of the 
shaping variables in how the global economy has been changing swiftly 
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in recent decades, and the effects of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
have arguably accelerated these structural shifts.
2
 
Part I identifies three discrete phenomena in the state capital arena. 
First, the recent surge in state-led capitalism reflects centuries old tradi-
tions in trading and investment in both the Western and Eastern Hemi-
spheres. Secondly, recent rises in state capital investment reflect broader 
macroeconomic trends, in particular the rising economic influence of 
Asian economies and the decoupling effect of these structural trends on 
capital flows in global markets. Thirdly, a key subcategory of state capi-
tal actors, Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), is gaining influence in glob-
al capital markets. Part II builds on this analysis by considering the regu-
latory implications of the increasing influence of SWFs, especially in 
multilateral contexts. These broader international developments have 
specific national consequences, and Part II focuses in on the foreign in-
vestment regulatory regime in Australia. Part III provides a detailed case 
study of Chinese investment in Australia. The changing patterns of Chi-
nese investment in Australia reflect many of the key structural macroe-
conomic changes and regulatory governance issues discussed in the ear-
lier parts of this paper. Moreover, the Sino–Australian case study of Part 
III highlights not only the methodological difficulties associated with 
researching state capital investment, but also the importance of acknowl-
edging and responding to these methodological challenges in public dis-
course and policy development on foreign direct investment. 
I. STATE CAPITAL IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 
Recent developments regarding rising investment activity by state 
actors have a sense of Back to the Future about them. For example, char-
                                                 
 2. This paper is not focused on the GFC, but there is a substantial literature on its causes and 
effects, including the following: INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: 
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http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/hart/jcls/2009/00000009/00000001/art00002; Gary B. Gor-
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Paper No. 15787, 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15787; Essential Information & 
Consumer Educ. Found., Sold Out: How Wall Street and Washington Betrayed America, WALL ST. 
WATCH (Mar. 2009), http://www.wallstreetwatch.org/reports/sold_out.pdf. 
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ter companies such as the East India Company (EIC) bear similarities to 
many contemporary state capital actors with their close linkages to state 
power and, in many cases, an emphasis on trading in commodities.
3
 
The first manifestation of the EIC was established in 1600 during 
the reign of Queen Elizabeth I as the Governor and Merchants of London 
Trading with the East Indies.
4
 The EI0C, which evolved through several 
forms, received monopoly trading advantages and other support from the 
Crown, including five Acts in 1670 during the reign of Charles II that 
accorded regal legitimacy to the EIC to command troops, make war and 
peace, mint money, annex territory, and administer criminal and civil 
justice over the territory it controlled.
5
 
Contemporary state capital actors obviously do not play the same 
militaristic and governmental roles as the EIC, but they do have close 
linkages to their national governments and play important roles in facili-
tating their sovereign’s economic and political influence in foreign terri-
tories. As discussed below, concern has been voiced in recent years in 
many quarters about these growing levels of influence, and there has 
been multilateral regulatory innovation regarding SWFs in particular.
6
 
SWFs and other state-related pools of capital, such as State Owned En-
terprises (SOEs),
7
 State Pension Funds (SPFs), and Commodity Stabili-
zation Funds (CSFs), are acknowledged as increasingly valuable sources 
of liquidity in capital markets that have been drained of liquidity in re-
cent years. Many of the intrinsic challenges associated with regulating 
the international finance sector in a post-GFC era have come into play in 
recent years in multilateral efforts to mediate the increasing levels of ac-
tivity and influence exercised by the diverse constituency of financial 
sector actors that have been bundled together under the state capital la-
                                                 
 3. For a discussion of how various interest groups interacted in shaping the policy priorities of 
the East India Company, see H.V. BOWEN, THE BUSINESS OF EMPIRE: THE EAST INDIA COMPANY 
AND IMPERIAL BRITAIN 17561833 (2006). 
 4. Id. 
 5. 8 ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA 835 (11th ed. 1911). Similarly, the Dutch East India United 
Company (EIC), the Vereenigde Oost-indische Compagnie (VOC), was founded in 1602 when the 
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1670 to administer trade in the Hudson Bay region and beyond, effecting a monopoly on the fur 
trade. For many years, the HBC acted as a de facto government across large swathes of territory. See 
BRYCE GEORGE, THE REMARKABLE HISTORY OF THE HUDSON’S BAY COMPANY 12 (1968). 
 6. The regulatory innovation regarding SWFs is discussed in more detail below, and this paper 
employs a working definition of SWFs as state owned investment funds comprised of financial 
assets. 
 7. A working definition of SOEs is that they are widely deemed to be state-owned operating 
companies rather than investment mechanisms, such as SWFs. 
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bel.
8
 These mutual challenges include the following: balancing the inter-
ests of state and private actors; the transnational nature of much financial 
sector activity; creating market regulatory conditions that can deliver 
appropriate balances between liquidity supply and opportunity for profit; 
the need to protect the national interest of jurisdictions but not encourage 
protectionism; and the increasing hybridization of financial sector actors, 
products, and services. 
These challenges have been heightened by GFC ramifications, 
which continue to impact upon political, economic, and legal agendas. 
For example, in order to save failing banks, some governments have 
part-nationalized (e.g., Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds in the United 
Kingdom) or nationalized them (e.g., Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the 
United States, and Northern Rock in the United Kingdom).
9
 An effect of 
the GFC-induced emergency measures is that the entwined regulatory–
investment role of the state becomes cloudier as jurisdictions that might 
previously have slotted comfortably into the category of recipients of 
state capital have become more active state capital investment actors 
themselves. This raises questions about how the state can manage simul-
taneously the potential conflicts of being an active investment actor, a 
detached and independent regulator, a recipient of inward investment 
from both state and non-state sources, and the promoter of the national 
interest. The increasing investment role of SWFs, SOEs, and other state-
related pools of capital reflect changing relationships in the global econ-
omy, especially the economic rise of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, 
India, and China). 
As the strategic economic and political importance of these coun-
tries increases, so does the need to understand how international regula-
tory infrastructures must evolve to accommodate these changes. For ex-
ample, SOE capitalization constitutes a significant element in three of the 
BRIC countries. According to the Economist, in 2012, SOEs comprised 
80% of the value of the stock market in China, 62% in Russia, and 38% 
in Brazil, as depicted in Figure 1 below; SOEs accounted for one-third of 
                                                 
 8. The definitional difficulties of unpacking this label and the practical dilemmas of research-
ing in this area of state capital are an ongoing theme of this paper. 
 9. There has been significant academic and media coverage of these events and their implica-
tions. E.g., Robert J. Rhee, Fiduciary Exemption for Public Necessity: Shareholder Profit, Public 
Good, and the Hobson’s Choice During a National Crisis, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 661 (2010); 
Roman A. Tomasic, The Rescue of Northern Rock: Nationalization in the Shadow of Insolvency, 1 
CORP. RESCUE & INSOLVENCY 109 (2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1422571; Dale A. Oesterle, The Collapse of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Victims or 
Villains? (Ohio St. Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 127, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com 
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1645330; Philip Aldrick, RBS and Northern Rock to Unveil Radical 
Strategies, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 22, 2009, 10:12 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysecto 
r/banksandfinance/4782762/RBS-and-Northern-Rock-to-unveil-radical-strategies.html (U.K.). 
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the emerging world’s foreign direct investment from 2003–2010.
10
 And 
according to Chinese government records, Chinese foreign direction in-
vestment (FDI) was set to increase by 15% in 2013.
11
 
Figure 1: Share of SOE Capitalization on the MSCI National Stock   





This rapidly rising pool of SOE investment capital is part of the sto-
ry of the decoupling effects of contemporary fundamental changes in 
East–West capital flows with attendant global imbalances regarding the 
management of exchange rates and reserves. The most obvious example 
of this is the rapidly increasing global economic influence of China. For 
example, China increased its foreign reserves from $21 billion in 1992 
(5% of its annual GDP)
13
 to $31,202 billion in 2012 (45% of its annual 
GDP).
14
 These decoupling effects are fuelled by the fact that emerging 
markets have grown at an average of 5.5% (in contrast to 1.6% for de-
veloped nations) in recent years, and the activity of these emerging mar-
kets is projected to make up half of the world’s GDP by 2020 (see Table 
1 below). 
 
                                                 
 10. Adrian Wooldridge, The Visible Hand, ECONOMIST, Jan. 21, 2012, http://www.economist. 
com/node/21542931. 
 11. KPMG & Univ. of Sydney China Studies Ctr., Demystifying Chinese Investment in Austral-
ia: Update March 2013, KPMG, 1 (Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.kpmg.com/AU/en/IssuesAndInsight 
s/ArticlesPublications/china-insights/Documents/demystifying-chinese-investment-in-australia-mar 
ch-2013-v2.pdf (Austl.) [hereinafter KPMG 2013]. 
 12. Wooldridge, supra note 10. 
 13. Zheng M. Song, Kjetil Storesletten & Fabrizio Zilibotti, Growing Like China (Centre for 
Econ. Policy Research, Working Paper No. DP7149, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com 
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1345675. 
 14. Kenneth Rapoza, China’s Cash Hoard Nearly Half Its GDP, FORBES (May 25, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2012/05/25/chinas-cash-hoard-nearly-half-its-gdp/. 
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Table 1: GDP Growth: Advanced vs. Emerging Economies
15
 
Actual Average Annual Percentage Change Projected 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2018 










































Euro Area 3.2 3.0 0.4 -4.4 2.0 1.4 -0.6 -0.3 1.6 
Japan 1.7 2.2 -1.0 -5.5 4.7 -0.6 2.0 1.6 1.1 










































Russia 8.2 8.5 5.2 -7.8 4.5 4.3 3.4 3.4 3.6 
India 9.4 10.1 6.2 5.0 11.2 7.7 4.0 5.7 7.0 
China 12.7 14.2 9.6 9.2 10.4 9.3 7.8 8.0 8.5 
Qatar 26.2 18.0 17.7 12.0 16.7 13.0 6.6 5.2 6.5 
Saudi  
Arabia 
5.6 6.0 8.4 1.8 7.4 8.5 6.8 4.4 4.3 
 
This shifting economic gravity towards emerging markets means 
that a more varied mix of macroeconomic organizational models is shap-
ing the global economy. Significantly, state-directed capital is flowing 
outward from emerging economies on a global scale. This capital flow is 
exemplified by China’s “Going Out”
16
 or “Going Global”
17
 strategy, pur-
suant to which state-owned entities actively seek to acquire foreign as-
sets and equity interests as opposed to merely trading in global commod-
ities and raw materials.
18
 Indeed, China has emerged to rival the United 
                                                 
 15. World Economic Outlook: Hopes, Realities, Risks, INT’L MONETARY FUND, at 149 tbl.A1, 
153–55 tbl.A4 (Apr. 2013), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/. 
 16. See Nicholas Calcina Howson, China’s Acquisitions Abroad—Global Ambitions, Domestic 
Effects, LAW QUADRANGLE NOTES 73 (2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1345909. 
 17. KPMG & Univ. of Sydney China Studies Ctr., Demystifying Chinese Investment in Austral-
ia: Update August 2012, KPMG, 5 (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.kpmg.com/AU/en/IssuesAndInsights/ 
ArticlesPublications/china-insights/Documents/demystifying-chinese-investment-2012.pdf (Austl.) 
[hereinafter KPMG 2012]. 
 18. Howson, supra note 16, at 73. 
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States as the most important economy in the world. Wooldridge of the 
Economist writes: “Over the past ten years [China’s] GDP has more than 
trebled to $11 trillion. China has taken over from Japan as the world’s 
second-biggest economy, and from America as the world’s biggest mar-
ket for many consumer goods.”
19
 The top ten biggest companies in the 
world (by revenue) under 2012 rankings include three Chinese SOEs; 
this exceeds the number of European and U.K. companies, and comes 
just behind that of the United States.
20
 
The huge increases in China’s economy and its foreign reserves are 
testimony to strong underlying growth trends, which commentators and 
analysts expect to continue. For example, in Table 3 below, using a sam-
ple of 122 countries accounting for more than 95% of global GDP, econ-
omists Dale Jorgensen and Khuong Vu have predicted how shares of 




Table 3: Percentage Share of Global GDP
22
 
2010 (%) 2020 (%) 
China 13.92 20.08 
U.S. 20.14 17.44 
G 7 40.62 33.30 
Asia 7 25.16 33.18 
China as % of Asia 7 GDP 55.35 60.52 
U.S. as % of G8 GDP 49.59 52.39 
 
By 2020, China will have replaced the United States as the world’s 
largest economy with 20.08% of global GDP (up from 13.92% in 
2010).
23
 In the same period, the U.S. share of global GDP is expected to 
fall from 20.14% to 17.44%.
24
 This changing of the economic guard as it 
were in terms of the global economy is not confined merely to China and 
the United States because there are regional forces at work as well, espe-
cially in Asia. For example, the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, United Kingdom, and United States) share of global GDP is ex-
pected to fall from 40.62% in 2010 to 33.30% in 2020, and the Asia 7 
                                                 
 19. Wooldridge, supra note 10. 
 20. Global 500, CNN MONEY (July 23, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global 
500/2012/full_list/. 
 21. See generally Dale W. Jorgensen & Khuong M. Vu, The Rise of Developing Asia and the 
New Economic Order (Lee Kuan Yew Sch. of Pub. Policy, Research Paper No. PP11-21, 2011), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1904716. 
 22. See id. at 25. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
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(China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea, and Tai-
wan) share is expected to rise from 25.16% in 2010 to 33.18% in 2020.
25
 
The United States and China dominate their respective groupings. The 
U.S. share of the G7 GDP is estimated to be 49.59% in 2010 and 52.385 
in 2020.
26
 China’s share of the Asia 7 GDP is estimated to be 55.35% in 
2010 and 60.52% in 2020.
27
 
If these trends transpire into reality, which seems likely, then there 
will be a direct 7%+ transference of total global GDP from the G7 to the 
Asia 7 in only ten years and further concentration of the strategic signifi-
cance of China and the United States in their respective groupings. This 
would be a dramatic shift in economic power, and history demonstrates 
that such economic shifts influence change in other areas such as foreign 
policy, strategic alliances, and regulation in multilateral contexts. The 
economic significance of China and the United States is also clear in Ta-
ble 4 below, in which a 2013 PwC Economics report projects across a 
longer time span how the top global economies based on Purchasing 




Table 4: Actual and Projected Top 20 Economies Ranked Based           
on GDP (in PPP)
29
 
     2011          2030       2050 
PPP 
Rank 
Country GDP at PPP 
(2011 US$ bn) 
Country Projected GDP 
at PPP 
(2011 US$ bn) 
Country Projected GDP 
at PPP 
(2011 US$ bn) 
1 U.S. 15,094 China 30,634 China 53,856 
2 China 11,347 U.S. 23,376 U.S. 37,998 
3 India 4,531 India 13,716 India 34,704 
4 Japan 4,381 Japan 5,842 Brazil 8,825 
5 Germany 3,221 Russia 5,308 Japan 8,065 
6 Russia 3,031 Brazil 4,685 Russia 8,013 
7 Brazil 2,305 Germany 4,118 Mexico 7,409 
8 France 2,303 Mexico 3,662 Indonesia 6,346 
9 U.K. 2,287 U.K. 3,499 Germany 5,822 
10 Italy 1,979 France 3,427 France 5,714 
                                                 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. World in 2050, The BRICS and Beyond: Prospects, Challenges and Opportunities, PWC,  2 
(Jan. 2013), http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/world-2050/the-brics-and-beyond-prospects-challenges-and-
opportunities.jhtml. 
 29. Id. 
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If these estimates are correct, then China will likely be the domi-
nant economic power globally before the middle of the century. Im-
portantly, China and some of the other fastest-growing economies that 
feature prominently in these tables have significant state capital invest-
ment actors. Indeed, tracing the evolution of SWFs exemplifies the com-
plex forces underpinning the mosaic of contemporary state capital actors. 
SWFs are a growing influence in global capital markets. For exam-
ple, in Table 5 below, Coleman shows the fifteen largest countries with 
SWFs by assets under management in March 2013 using Sovereign 





























                                                 
 30. Isobel Coleman, Graph: Sovereign Wealth Funds, Council on Foreign Relations, COUNCIL 
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Apr. 24, 2013), http://blogs.cfr.org/coleman/2013/04/24/graph-sovereign-
wealth-funds/. 
 31. Id. “Asterisks indicate where the assets of a country’s multiple SWFs have been added 
together. The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute notes that one of the Russian funds ‘includes the oil 
stabilization fund of Russia’ and that the figure for China’s largest fund ‘is a best guess estimation.’” 
Id.; see also Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND INST. (Aug. 2013), 
http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/ (supplying the data for the graph). 
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SWFs are increasingly visible and valued players in global financial 
markets. But even for those with extensive resources, there is a substan-
tial reliance on best guesswork regarding their practices and processes. It 
can be difficult to gather hard data because often powerful actors are in-
volved who do not welcome scrutiny, which leads to difficulties not only 
in measuring the scale of the activity and its effects but also in evaluating 
regulatory responses to such activity.Compounding this empirical uncer-
tainty is the ambiguity that can sometimes surround white-collar crime, 
financial crime, and state capital investment because their effects can be 
more diffused. It is this diffusion of effect, especially in geopolitical con-
texts, which accentuates some of the criticism of state capital, as dis-
cussed in more detail below. 
There is definitional uncertainty about forms of state-related capital 
and how they should be classified partly because numerous types of ac-
tors have been collapsed into popular understandings of the term. For 
example, SWFs have probably received more academic scrutiny than 
other forms of state capital, but there are a wide range of definitions put 
forward by commentators and organizations. Truman defines SWFs as “a 
descriptive term for a separate pool of government-owned or govern-
ment-controlled financial assets that includes some international as-
sets.”
32
 Lowery, the U.S. Undersecretary for International Affairs at the 
time, defined SWFs as “a government investment vehicle[,] which is 
funded by foreign exchange assets, and which manages these assets sepa-
rately from official reserves.”
33
 The European Commission (EC) notes 
that SWFs are “generally defined as state-owned investment vehicles, 
which manage a diversified portfolio of domestic and international fi-
nancial assets.”
34
  The International Working Group (IWG) sees SWFs as 
a heterogeneous group with five subcategories based on their main objec-
tive: (i) stabilization funds whose primary objective is to help insulate 
the economy from the effects of commodity (usually oil) price swings; 
(ii) savings funds for future generations and to mitigate the effects of 
Dutch disease;
35
 (iii) reserve investment corporations; (iv) development 
                                                 
 32. Edwin M. Truman, A Blueprint for Sovereign Wealth Fund Best Practices, PETERSEN INST. 
INT’L ECON., 1 (2008),  http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb08-3.pdf. 
 33. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks by Acting Undersecretary for Interna-
tional Affairs Clay Lowery on Sovereign Wealth Funds and the International Financial System, 
(June 21, 2007) , available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp471.aspx. 
 34. Comm’n of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to The 
European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and The Com-
mittee of the Regions: A Common European Approach to Sovereign Wealth Funds, at 4, 
COM(2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/sovereign_en.pdf. 
 35. Dutch disease is defined by Investorwords.com: “The deindustrialization of a nation’s 
economy that occurs when the discovery of a natural resource raises the value of that nation’s cur-
rency, making manufactured goods less competitive with other nations, increasing imports and de-
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funds; and (v) contingent pension reserve funds that provide for unspeci-
fied pension liabilities on the government’s balance sheet.
36
 Jen believes 
that SWFs have five basic ingredients: (i) sovereign; (ii) high foreign 
currency exposure; (iii) no explicit liabilities; (iv) high risk tolerance; 
and (v) long investment horizon.
37
 A number of SWFs themselves com-
bined as an interest group in 2008 and offered their own definition as 
part of their Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP): 
SWFs are defined as special purpose investment funds or arrange-
ments, owned by the general government. Created by the general 
government for macroeconomic purposes, SWFs hold, manage, or 
administer assets to achieve financial objectives, and employ a set 




So, it can be seen that SWFs are difficult to classify, and there are 
many grey areas, for example, between central banks’ foreign reserves 
management and other types of investment vehicles. Pension funds are 
not SWFs even though they may be government sponsored, but they do 
have a clear link to the beneficiaries via fiduciary duties. Some SWFs are 
legal entities (e.g., ADIA in Abu Dhabi), others are corporations (e.g., 
Temasek in Singapore), and others are not legal persons (e.g., Norway 
Government Global Fund). 
Academic interest in the forms of state capital, such as SWFs, ap-
pears to be relatively recent. For example, although some SWFs have 
been in existence for sixty years,
39
 public recognition of the label SWF is 
quite recent.
40
 The jurisdictions that operate SWFs and other forms of 
state capital are extremely diverse; some are authoritarian one-party 
states, while others are sophisticated democracies, and they range from 
                                                                                                             
creasing exports.” INVESTORWORDS, http://www.investorwords.com/1604/dutch_disease.html (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2014). The term originated in the Netherlands after the discovery of North Sea gas in 
the 1970s and is an ongoing concern for resource-rich jurisdictions, prompting several to establish 
SWFs. Id.; see also Paul Krugman, The Narrow Moving Band, the Dutch Disease, and the Competi-
tive Consequences of Mrs. Thatcher, 27 J. DEV. ECON. 41, 50 (1987), available at http://www.eco. 
uc3m.es/~desmet/trade/KrugmanJDE1987.pdf. 
 36. Sovereign Wealth Funds—A Work Agenda, INT’L MONETARY FUND, 5 (Feb. 29, 2008), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/022908.pdf. 
 37. Stephen Jen, The Definition of a Sovereign Wealth Fund, MORGAN STANLEY GLOBAL 
FORUM (Oct. 26, 2007), http://www.morganstanley.com/views/gef/archive/2007/20071026-Fri.html. 
 38. Sovereign Wealth Funds: Generally Accepted Principles and Practices “Santiago Princi-
ples,” INT’L WORKING GRP. SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, 27 (Oct. 2008), http://www.iwg-swf. 
org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf [hereinafter GAPP]. 
 39. The Kuwait Investment Office (KIO) was established in London in 1953 as an asset man-
ager for Kuwait’s Foreign Ministry.  Id. at 38. 
 40. The term Sovereign Wealth Fund appears to have been introduced by Rozanov in 2005. See 
Andrew Rozanov, Who Holds the Wealth of Nations?, CENTRAL BANKING (May 20, 2005), 
http://www.centralbanking.com/central-banking-journal/feature/2072255/holds-wealth-nations. 
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highly developed oil/gas exporters in Europe (e.g., Norway, Russia), to 
less developed ones in the Middle East (e.g., United Arab Emirates, Ku-
wait), to large and small manufacturing and trading entrepôts in Asia 
(e.g., China, Korea, Singapore), to broad-based commodity exporters 




It seems inevitable that state capital actors, including SWFs, will 
get bigger and become increasingly important vehicles for the recycling 
of global finance, namely, channeling capital from surplus (balance of 
payments) generating countries to deficit countries. However, their size, 
number, growth, and scale of activity will still be influenced by the cor-
responding size and trends in global macroeconomic imbalances them-
selves. Exchange rate regimes, namely the prevalence or otherwise of 
dollar-type pegs and domestic inflation issues, will also have an influ-
ence on their size, growth, and number. Real and nominal rates of return 
on benchmark sovereign assets in the major advanced economies will 
also have an influence in as far as sovereign wealth portfolio shifts are 
affected. The public accumulation of assets by energy-exporting coun-
tries is expected to continue if constraints on energy supply relative to 
demand remain, which does seem likely over the medium to longer term. 
It is highly likely that state-capital actors, including SWFs, increasingly 
will be seen as favored pools of available liquid capital. Continuing rela-
tively low growth rates and subsequently low returns on investment capi-
tal can be expected in major advanced economies, so investment will be 
channeled increasingly into emerging markets, and state capital actors 
will be an important conduit in such processes. 
The last five years have seen a dramatic recasting away from the 
predominant philosophy that had driven financial markets’ development 
and their regulation in the last three decades—that is, a commitment to 
free market ideology underpinned by light-touch regulation under the 
canvas of regulatory competition to attract increasing amounts of inward 
investment. Since 2008, liquidity in global markets has reduced and con-
cerns about sovereign debt have grown as appetite for risk has dimin-
ished globally.
42
 Interwoven with this, a new era of more proactive state-
led investment capitalism is emerging with state-related pools of capital 
key to this process. This significant change has been driven by what 
                                                 
 41. Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings, supra note 31. The SWFI estimated total SWF funds in 
July 2013 at $5,473.3 billion and specified their geographical origins as follows: 40% are in Asia; 
35% in the Middle East; 17% in Europe; 3% in Africa; 3% in the Americas; and 2% in other areas of 
the world. Id. 
 42. Valentin Bruno & Hyun Song-Shin, Capital Flows, Cross-Border Banking and Global 
Liquidity, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19308,  2013), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19038. 
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then-Australian Treasurer Wayne Swan described in 2009 as “spectacu-
lar regulatory failure,” stressing the new prevailing international consen-
sus that the state must be a more active investor in markets as well as a 
more active overseer of their design and regulation.
43
 This is the new 
international financial environment and geopolitical reality in which ex-
isting and future state-related pools of capital are likely to become in-
creasingly proactive and influential, contributing to financial markets and 
the broader economy in Australia and around the world. 
State capitalism is undeniably on the rise. However, reflecting on 
geopolitical and geoeconomic realities, U.S. concerns have been pivotal 
in shaping the discourse on what capitalism is and how it should be con-
stituted. In a post-GFC world, as the twenty-first century progresses and 
the economic power of Asian countries in particular grow, market per-
ceptions about appropriate levels of activity by the state as an investor in 
capital markets may well change. Much of the post-GFC global financial 
reform agenda has focused on leverage and systemic risk issues, and in-
creasing the capability of jurisdictions to know what levels of invest-
ment, leverage, and systemic risk are in their markets.
44
 In terms of state-
related pools of investment activity, there remains considerable uncer-
tainty and ambiguity about their levels of investment, but in general, they 
tend to be less leveraged than many of their private sector counterparts 
and are therefore perceived by some as less of a threat to market stability. 
Despite these lower leverage ratios, the sheer scale of SWF investments 
and their growing influence in capital markets means that there is in-
creasing scrutiny of their activities. Indeed, in recent years there has been 
increased debate about whether there should be specific regulatory re-
quirements for SWFs in particular and state capital in general.
45
 We trace 
these tensions in the next Part by outlining American and European reac-
tions to state capital investment activity and then by analyzing how this 
reaction has fed into the emergence of multilateral regulatory initiatives 
regarding SWFs. We then examine how the foreign investment regulato-
ry regime in Australia has sought to address specific issues raised by in-
creased inward investment from state capital actors. 
                                                 
 43. Mark Franklin, Wayne Swan Calls for New Controls on Free Market, AUSTRALIAN (Jan. 
24, 2009), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/breaking-news/swan-calls-for-reform-of-marke 
ts/story-e6frg90f-1111118652144. 
 44. Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instru-
ments: Initial Considerations, BANK INT’L SETTLEMENTS (Nov. 2009), http://www.bis.org/publ/ 
othp07.htm. 
 45. See, e.g., Simone Mezzacapo, The So-Called “Sovereign Wealth Funds”: Regulatory Is-
sues, Stability and Prudential Supervisions, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Apr. 2009), http://ec.europa.eu/ 
economy_finance/publications/publication15064_en.pdf.  
610 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:597 
II. REGULATORY REGIMES AND STATE CAPITAL 
The traditional view of state capital actors (especially SWFs) is as 
long-term investors that can provide liquidity in times of crisis and have 
large holding power. However, there is an increasing trend amongst state 
capital actors, including SWFs, towards investment diversification and a 
growing desire and capacity for risk, which has implications for cross-
border foreign exchange liquidity. If SWFs are taken as an example of 
the changing significance of the broader pools of state-related capital, 
then in recent years they have become more varied and aggressive in 
their investment strategies, raising fears that forms of financial protec-
tionism will be thrown up by some nation states to defend against such 
activity.
46
 This section will first explore the effects of multilateral re-
gimes for SWFs and then explore the Australian foreign investment re-
gime. 
A. Multilateral Regime for SWFs 
Broader macroeconomic factors seem to play an important role in 
heating or cooling the debate on state-led investments.
47
 For example, 
protectionist sentiment was stoked by the takeover in 2006 by Dubai 
Ports World (DPW), a state-owned company in the United Arab Emir-
ates, of the port management businesses of a number of seaports in the 
United States that were already in foreign ownership by the U.K. firm 
P&O. Even though the Bush Administration gave approval for the deal, 
protectionism sentiment stimulated the specter of cross-border nationali-
zation because state-related capital was behind DPW, and this gained 
public and congressional traction, including the House Panel voting 62–2 
on March 8, 2006, to block the deal.
48
 In December 2006, the controver-
sy contributed to DPW selling the seaport management businesses to the 
American International Group.
49
 The DPW controversy attests to sensi-
tivities in the United States towards investment by foreign government 
entities. One survey of 1,000 registered U.S. voters (weighted by race 
                                                 
 46. Steve J. Weisman, Concern About Sovereign Wealth Funds Spreads to Washington, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 20, 2007),  http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/20/business/worldbusiness/20iht-wealth. 
4.7186699.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 47. Some of the media coverage was quite hostile. E.g., David R. Francis, Will Sovereign 
Wealth Funds Rule the World?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 26, 2007), http://www.csmonitor. 
com/2007/1126/p16s01-wmgn.html. 
 48. See Carl Levin, U.S. Senator, Opening Remarks at the Senate Armed Services Committee 
Briefing on Port Security, (Feb. 23, 2006), available at http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release. 
cfm?id=251838; Robert Gay, US Feels Power of Cashed-up Foreign Funds, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Nov. 
29, 2007, at 1. 
 49. As AIG Buys DPW’s US Assets, WORLD CARGO NEWS (Dec. 11, 2006), http://www.world 
cargonews.com/htm/n20070118.117570.htm. 
2014] State Capital: Global and Australian Perspectives 611 
and education in an effort to be a representative sample), conducted by 
Public Strategies Inc., revealed significant levels of distrust about foreign 
investment in the United States in general and state pools of capital in 
particular.
50
 Seventy-two percent of respondents believed that foreign 
governments do not reveal enough about their investment portfolios; six-
ty-eight percent opposed government investment from Saudi Arabia; and 
similar scores were recorded for other jurisdictions—for example, Abu 
Dhabi (62%), China (65%), and Russia (61%).
51
 The sample of course 
was not comprehensively representative of the U.S. population in gen-
eral, but ongoing public pressure of this sort contributed to legislative 
change in the form of H.R. 556: Foreign Investment and National Securi-
ty Act of 2007, which passed in the House 423–0 and was signed into 
law by President Bush on July 26, 2007. The pressure in the United 
States continued during the Bush Administration in 2007 with Mr. Henry 
Paulson, former U.S. Treasury Secretary, voicing concern about political 
motivations influencing the investments of SWFs and calling for a multi-
lateral regime to monitor their activities.
52
 Also, in 2007, the Committee 
on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) raised the require-
ments around inward sovereign investments and increased the numbers 
of examinations of such investment.
53
 
Similarly, the EC stated that it “cannot allow non-European funds 
to be run in an opaque manner or used as an implement of geopolitical 
strategy” and reserved the right to introduce specific European legisla-
tion if increased transparency from SWFs was not achieved through vol-
untary means.
54
 These concerns largely centered on whether the invest-
ment activities of these actors could lead to distortions in asset prices or 
excessive risk taking. The anxieties on both sides of the Atlantic show 
that geopolitical security concerns are an inevitable element of SWF re-
porting. The establishment of the International Working Group of Sover-
eign Wealth Funds (IWGSWF) and the development of the GAPP can, 
partially at least, be seen as a response to such political pressures. 
The gathering global recession of 2008 coincided with some inter-
esting multilateral developments regarding SWFs and how they chose to 
                                                 
 50. Survey Reveals Voters Wary of Foreign Government Investment, PUB. STRATEGIES INC. 
(Feb. 21, 2008), http://www.pstrategies.com/index.php/survey-reveals-voters-wary-of-foreign-gover 
nment-investment.htm. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Tony Walker, Call to Keep Funds Free of Political Bias, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Oct. 22, 
2007. 
 53. Section 721 of The Defense Production Act of 1950, Notice, COMM. ON FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT U.S. (CFIUS) (Oct. 2007), http://cfius.us/modules/news/. 
 54. Sean O’Grady, Europe’s Code for Sovereign Wealth Funds, BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 26, 
2008), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-02-26/europes-code-for-sovereign-wealth-funds 
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present themselves as a grouping to the world. In May 2008, in Washing-
ton D.C., twenty-five SWFs from jurisdictions as varied as Australia, 
Botswana, Chile, China, Norway, Russia, Singapore, Trinidad and Toba-
go, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States formed the Interna-
tional Working Group (IWG), in cooperation with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, as a partial response to some 
of the criticism about their investment activities and motivations. Com-
position of the IWG largely comprised representatives of finance indus-
tries and central banks. The IWG established a small secretariat and gave 
it the task of developing a set of principles that reflected the investment 
practices and objectives of SWFs.
55
 The IMF’s role was as a facilitator of 
the process, and recipient countries were involved. Only five months lat-
er, at a meeting in Santiago, Chile, in October 2008, the IWG formally 
declared the GAPP.
56
 IWG members committed to operate by the GAPP; 
some of the core twenty-four voluntary principles include good govern-
ance, accountability, transparency, and a commitment to financially mo-
tivated investment strategies.
57
 Twenty-five very different countries were 
involved, and a range of highly technical complex issues were covered in 
a short period of time. The IMF played a key role behind the scenes by 
moderating media perceptions of SWFs, particularly in calming anxieties 
surrounding China’s state-capital investment policies that had put much 
of the intensity into contemporary debates about SWFs, especially in the 
United States. 
At the media conference formally announcing the Santiago Princi-
ples, the IWG drafting Chair, Mr. David Murray (at the time, Chairman 
of Australia’s Future Fund), stated that the key task was to establish trust 
in recipient countries based on notions of openness and legitimacy.
58
 His 
sentiments were echoed by Joaquín Almunia, European Commissioner 
for Economic and Monetary Affairs, who also added that the long-term 
investment horizons of state-related pools of capital like SWFs would be 
extremely important in preserving mutual trust across international fi-
nancial markets and their associated regulatory environments.
59
   
                                                 
 55. See generally INT’L WORKING GROUP SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, http://www.iwg-
swf.org/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2013). 
 56. GAPP, supra note 38. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Press Conference Working Call: International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 
INT’L WORKING GROUP SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS (Sept. 2, 2008), http://www.iwg-swf.org/tr/ 
swftr0801.htm. 
 59. Simon Willson, Wealth Funds Group Publishes 24-Point Voluntary Principles, INT’L 
MONETARY FUND (Oct. 15, 2008), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2008/new10150 
8b.htm. 
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The IWG evolved into the International Forum of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds (IFSWF), the latter being formally established by the IWG 
in Kuwait City, in April 2009, to meet and exchange views, facilitate the 
GAPP, and encourage cooperation with recipient countries, international 
organizations, and capital markets actors.
60
 Since then, the IFSWF has 
met in Baku, Azerbaijan (October 2009), Sydney, Australia (May 2010), 
Beijing, China (May 2011), and Mexico City, Mexico (September 2012) 
and is scheduled to meet in Oslo, Norway in October 2013. 
The IFSWF operates in a fairly discreet manner with very limited 
published material, but in July 2011, it did publish a report about IFSWF 
Members’ Investment and Operational Practices with a particular empha-
sis on the GAPP.
61
 The report reveals that approximately 80% of Mem-
bers participated in the IFSWF surveys, that their investment activities 
are commercially motivated, that there were differing levels of compli-
ance with the GAPP amongst Members, and that, in the view of the 
IFSWF, it was not reasonable or possible to expect uniform compliance 
with the GAPP from all IFSWF Members. So, although the GAPP, the 
IFSWF, and the report demonstrate some progress in transparency re-
garding SWFs, the comments in 2007 of the IMF still carry weight: 
“[T]here’s a lot we don’t know about sovereign funds. Very few of them 
publish information about their assets, liabilities, or investment strate-
gies.”
62
 Some state capital actors may be a little more open, but with a 
significant number of sovereign states involved having authoritarian po-
litical regimes, it is unsurprising that it can be hard to easily evaluate lev-
els and locations of investment activity. 
In considering the issue of how state capital actors such as SWFs 
might be regulated in multilateral contexts, it is not feasible or likely de-
sirable under pragmatic political realities that responsibility should lie 
with any international regulatory body. Rather, any exercise of regulato-
ry fiat should be exercised by the recipient jurisdictions and the domestic 
regulation, which inevitably impacts upon inward investment actors. This 
pragmatic stance is consistent with how investment norms are shaped 
and operationalized in international financial markets. 
Past attempts by international organizations to embed a top-down 
multilateral regulatory infrastructure to shape behavior by investment 
actors have not been notably successful. This lack of success was 
                                                 
 60. ‘Kuwait Declaration’: Establishment of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth 
Funds, INT’L WORKING GRP. SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS (Apr. 6, 2009), http://www.iwg-swf. 
org/mis/kuwaitdec.htm. 
 61. IFSWF Members’ Experiences in the Application of the Santiago Principles, INT’L FORUM 
OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS (July 7, 2011), www.ifswf.org/pst/stp070711.pdf. 
 62. Simon Johnson, The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 44 FIN. & DEV. 56, 57 (2007), avail-
able at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2007/09/straight.htm. 
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demonstrated by the OECD’s failure regarding its proposed Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (MAI) in the late 1990s.
63
 The key reason why 
the MAI failed was its lack of process legitimacy to jurisdictions that 
were not committed or bound by its central tenets. This lack of legitima-
cy obviously creates difficulties for organizations, such as the OECD, 
that are seeking to promote certain investment protocols as standard 
business practice via, for example, the OECD Declaration on Interna-
tional Investment and Multinational Enterprises
64
 and the OECD Codes 
of Liberalisation of Capital Movements.
65
 The latter has sought to coun-
ter protectionist activity, such as establishing artificial barriers to market 
entry. OECD Members are bound by these level-playing-field protocols, 
and not unexpectedly, many countries who are not members of the 
OECD have engaged in a certain amount of gaming of these protocols. In 
response to such political and commercial realities, the OECD is engag-
ing in new strategies of enforcement. For example, in July 2012, it dele-
gated full decision-making powers on the Codes of Liberalisation to the 
Investment Committee, which would be enlarged to include non-OECD 
Members prepared to meet the same obligations as OECD Members but, 
in return, would have the same rights as those Members.
66
 It will be in-
teresting to see how many jurisdictions consider such an initiative a suf-
ficiently attractive inducement. However, if international regulatory 




If further SWF and other state capital actor-related regulatory initia-
tives are to emerge, it is unlikely to be through specialist regulatory 
agencies. Rather, it is likely to be through codes of best practice, such as 
                                                 
 63. Multilateral Agreement on Investment, ORGANISATION ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 
http://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/multilateralagreementoninvestm
ent.htm  (Fr.) (last visited Sept. 28, 2013) [hereinafter MAI].  For an examination of the MAI and 
why it failed, see Katia Tieleman, The Failure of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) 
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 64. OECD Declaration and Decisions on International Investment and Multinational Enter-
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CAPITAL MOVEMENTS AND OF CURRENT INVISIBLE OPERATIONS: USER’S GUIDE (2003) (Fr.), avail-
able at browse.oecdbookshop.org/oecd/pdfs/product/2003021e.pdf 
 66. ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD CODE OF LIBERALISATION OF 
CAPITAL MOVEMENTS (2013) (Fr.), available at www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/capital 
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 67. For a critical analysis of the paramount importance of legitimacy in multilateral regulatory 
activity in the financial sectorm, see George Gilligan, Multi-Lateral Regulatory Initiatives–A Legiti-
mation-Based Approach, in GOVERNING THE CORPORATION: REGULATION AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN AN AGE OF SCANDAL AND GLOBAL MARKETS 121 (Justin O’ Brien ed., 2005). 
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the GAPP, and thence multilateral agreements brokered by international 
organizations, such as the Financial Stability Board (FSB)
68
 under its 
G20
69
 imprimatur or the OECD. As long ago as 2005, the OECD issued 
its guidelines on corporate governance of state-owned enterprises,
70
 but 
political economy and commercial realities have limited the scale of in-
fluence of the OECD. The key avenue for multilateral regulatory pro-
gress post-GFC has been the G20. In Toronto in June 2010, the G20 an-
nounced a financial sector reform agenda based on four pillars: (i) a 
strong regulatory framework; (ii) effective supervision; (iii) resolution 
and addressing systemic institutions; and (iv) transparent international 
assessment and peer review. The G20 Declaration stated: “[T]he core of 
the financial sector reform agenda rests on improving the strength of cap-
ital and liquidity and discouraging excessive leverage.”
71
 However, with 
regard to multilateral arenas, the constitutional and jurisdictional chal-
lenges for post-crisis regulatory reform are obviously much greater than 
in national contexts.
72
 They represent substantial changes in the calibra-
tion of international capital frameworks and are intended to militate 
against future global financial crises. Political economy factors have 
been and will continue to be crucial in shaping these international reform 
processes. This emphasis on intermediation, rather than new regulatory 
institutions, and an evolutionary approach is not only congruent with 
market realities, but it also constitutes a more legitimate use of regulatory 
power. 
Most recipient countries, including the United States, have foreign 
investment regimes to help in monitoring and partially controlling in-
                                                 
 68. See FIN. STABILITY BD., www.financialstabilityboard.org (last visited Sept. 28, 2013). 
 69. The Group of Twenty (G-20) Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors was estab-
lished in 1999 to bring together systemically important industrialized and developing economies to 
discuss key issues in the global economy. The inaugural meeting of the G-20 took place in Berlin on 
December 15–16, 1999, hosted by the German and Canadian Finance Ministers. The G-20 is made 
up of the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of nineteen countries: Argentina, Australia, 
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Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States of America. 
The European Union, who is represented by the rotating Council presidency and the European Cen-
tral Bank, is the 20th member of the G-20. See About G20, http://www.g20.org/about_what 
_is_g20.aspx (last visited Sept. 29, 2013). 
 70. ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD GUIDELINES ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES (2005) (Fr.), available at http://www.oecd.org/corp 
orate/ca/corporategovernanceofstate-ownedenterprises/34803211.pdf. 
 71. The G-20 Toronto Summit Declaration, G20 TORONTO CANADA, 15 (June 26–27, 2010), 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/Documents/The%20G-20%20Toronto%20 
Summit%20Declaration.pdf. 
 72. For a discussion of these issues with a focus on initiatives in the United Kingdom and how 
they are affected by European Union responsibilities, see Julia Black, Managing the Financial Cri-
sis—The Constitutional Dimension (LSE Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 12/2010, 2010), availa-
ble at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1619784. 
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ward investment, but they are of course sensitive to the ongoing need to 
balance the national interest with trade openness and the inevitable regu-
latory competition between jurisdictions as they seek to attract capital. In 
addition, most countries are capital dependent, and it is not feasible to 
screen all inward investment, so most will inevitably be approved. It is 
also important to note that many jurisdictions with SWFs, such as Aus-
tralia and Norway, are not only recipient countries of SWF investment 
but also have high levels of foreign investment generally. The activities 
of state capital actors, including SWFs, raise issues of the implications of 
cross-nationalization of assets and industries for jurisdictions all over the 
world. For example, states that are downstream consumers of commodi-
ties could potentially use their state-related pools of capital and invest-
ment vehicles to acquire the foreign companies that produce or own the 
rights to such commodities, thus leading to possible entrapments of gov-
ernance in some domestic contexts. Scenarios of this nature could have 
far-reaching implications for securities regulation, corporate governance, 
competition, and tax policies in the recipient countries of such invest-
ment, and governments around the world are increasingly taking note of 
these issues.
73
 There is an understandably strong desire across political 
party lines within most recipient countries to protect national interests. 
For example, the Economics References Committee of the Common-
wealth Senate of Australia stated, “The committee believes that the best 
way for Australia to regulate the conduct of foreign investors (be they 




B. The Australian Foreign Investment Regime 
Foreign investment in Australia is regulated under the legislative 
framework of the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeover Act 1975 (FATA). 
The other key component of Australia’s foreign investment regime is 
Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy (the Policy), which acknowledges 
the need that Australia has for foreign capital, reviewing foreign invest-
ment proposals in relation to the national interest on a case-by-case basis 
and setting out its approach in terms of who needs to apply, when they 
should apply, what the government is looking for, and how long before a 
                                                 
 73.  See, e.g., Australian Government, ‘Greater Certainty for Sovereign Investments–The 
Framework Rules’ (Consultation Paper, The Treasury, June 2010), available at http://archive.treasur 
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decision is made.
75
 The Australian Federal Treasurer has ultimate re-
sponsibility for decision making under Australia’s foreign investment 
regime and has broad discretion to decline any foreign investment appli-
cations he or she considers to be against the national interest.
76
 FATA 
defines foreign persons but does not define the national interest.
77
 The 
Treasurer receives recommendations on specific foreign investment pro-
posals from the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB), which is a 
non-statutory body that administers FATA and the Policy.
78
 However, 
FIRB’s functions are advisory only, and decision making resides with the 
Treasurer. Nevertheless, the substantial portion of activity under Austral-
ia’s foreign investment regime is handled by the conventional civil bu-
reaucracy, specifically the Foreign Investment and Trade Policy Division 
of the Treasury (the Division), which provides secretariat services 
through approximately twenty staff to the FIRB.
79
 Under an ongoing au-
thorization from the Treasurer (effectively a delegation), the Division 
evaluates proposals and makes decisions on those that are Policy con-
forming, lacking special sensitivity, or both. The vast majority of foreign 
investment applications fall into this category; for example, in 2011–
2012, more than 92% of proposals were decided under this delegated 
authority.
80
 Nevertheless, the FIRB is an advisory body and not a policy-
making entity. It is the government of the day that decides and expresses 
the Policy, and provides guidance on national interest in relation to for-
eign acquisitions through that Policy. Thus, Australian inward foreign 
investment and politics, and unfortunately on occasion, populism, are 
linked—especially, it would seem, in more recent times. 
For the most part, there is little controversy surrounding the over-
whelming majority of foreign investment applications. The context of 
where foreign investment is coming from and where it invests in Austral-
ia is discussed in more detail below in Part III. Rejection of foreign in-
vestment applications is not a statistically common event. For example, 
in 2011–2012, 10,703 applications for foreign investment proposals were 
approved with 5,803 subject to conditions specified by FIRB and 4,900 
not subject to any conditions imposed by FIRB. Thirteen were rejected, 
                                                 
 75. Treasury, Austl. Gov't, Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy, FOREIGN INVESTMENT REV. 
BOARD  (Mar. 4,  2013), www.firb.gov.au/content/_downloads/AFIP_2013.pdf [hereinafter Austral-
ia’s Foreign Investment Policy].  
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See generally FOREIGN INVESTMENT REV. BOARD, www.firb.gov.au/content/default.asp 
(last visited Nov. 25, 2013) (Austl.). 
 79. See generally id. 
 80. Annual Report 2011–12, FOREIGN INVESTMENT REV. BOARD, 6 (Dec. 20, 2012), 
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534 proposals were withdrawn, and 170 were deemed exempt from con-
ditions under the Policy.
81
 It is noticeable that real estate comprised the 
vast bulk of activity with 10,118 (94.5%) of the approvals and all of the 
thirteen rejections.
82
 Until relatively recently, there had been only one 
rejection of a substantial corporate transaction, and that occurred in 2001 
when Shell proposed that they acquire 100% of Woodside Petroleum, a 
proposal that was rejected by then-Treasurer Peter Costello.
83
 
However, in recent years the increased desire of state capital actors 
to invest in Australia, especially regarding the acquisition of Australian 
resources assets, has seen politics and populism assume a higher profile 
in the discourse on Australian foreign investment. Arguably, a sense of 
jingoism has always been lurking in the DNA of this discourse, as admit-
ted in a 2012 interview by the Chair of the FIRB, Brian Wilson: “The 
Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act was put in place in 1975, when 
there was a huge backlash against Australia being sold off to the Japa-
nese.”
84
 Almost forty years later, Australia is of course not a Japanese 
outpost, and it is likely that some of the scaremongering about inward 
Chinese investment to Australia in recent years may similarly have been 
overplayed. 
Nevertheless, there have been specific Australian regulatory re-
sponses to this specter of Chinese state capital inflows. For example, dur-
ing 2008, a Chinese SOE, Chinalco, first sought to take a significant 
stake in major Australian miner Rio Tinto, and there was heated public 
debate about potential threats posed by state capital interests owning stra-
tegically important Australian entities. Two weeks later, on February 17, 
2008, then-Treasurer Mr. Wayne Swan released six principles to improve 
the transparency of foreign investment screening processes that more 
clearly distinguish between investments by private entities and by for-
eign governments.
85
 Eventually, on August 24, 2008, the Treasurer did 
grant approval to Chinalco to acquire up to 14.99% of Rio Tinto because 
Chinalco had undertaken to the Treasurer not to raise its holdings with-
out seeking fresh approval from the Australian government and not to 
                                                 
 81. Id. at 19–20. 
 82. Id. at 19, 23. 
 83. Foreign Investment Proposal— Shell Australia Investments Limited’s Acquisition of 
Woodside Petroleum Limited, PETER COSTELLO (Apr. 23, 2001), http://www.petercostello.com.au/ 
press/2001/2429-foreign-investment-proposal-shell-australia-investments-limiteda-s-shell. 
 84. Glenda Korporaal, New FIRB Boss Keen to Lift Lid on Agency, AUSTRALIAN (May 12, 
2012), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/financial-services/new-firb-boss-keen-to-lift-lid-
on-agency/story-fn91wd6x-1226353377917. 
 85. Wayne Swan, ‘Government Improves Transparency of Foreign Investment Screening Pro-
cess’ (Media Release, No. 009, Feb. 17, 2008) (Austl.), available at http://ministers.treasury. 
gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2008/009.htm&pageID=003&min=wms&Year=&Doc
Type=0. 
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seek to appoint a director to Rio Tinto PLC or Rio Tinto Limited.
86
 Simi-
larly, on March 27, 2009, the Treasurer announced that China Minmetals 
Non-Ferrous Metals Co. Ltd. could not make a 100% acquisition of Oz 
Minerals if it included the Prominent Hill mining operations located 
within the Woomera Prohibited Area in southern Australia.
87
 On April 
23, 2009, the Treasurer did give approval, but it excluded the Prominent 
Hill mine and numerous other undertakings from China Minmetals Non-
Ferrous Metals Co. Ltd.
88
 
These are just a sampling of the decisions made in recent years un-
der Australia’s foreign investment regime that have resulted in increased 
tensions because Chinese interests view them as discriminatory. Recent-
ly, this disquiet has received media coverage when the high-profile Aus-
tralian government delegation traveled to China in April 2013 led by 
then-Prime Minister Julia Gillard. The delegation undertook trade and 
other inter-governmental negotiations. At that time, the Trade Minister 
Craig Emerson “admitted that talks on a free-trade deal with China had 
stalled because of a dispute over restrictions on investment in Australia 
by Chinese state-owned enterprises.”
89
 It is clear that this issue will play 
a prominent role in Sino–Australian relations for years to come, but what 
is the picture in recent years regarding inward foreign investment into 
Australia? 
III. CHINESE INVESTMENT IN AUSTRALIA 
Parts I and II pinpointed the global momentum of state-directed 
capitalization and mobilization from emerging economies, particularly 
China, which has important implications for foreign direct investment 
(FDI) into Australia. Indeed, Chinese investment into Australia repre-
sents a national strategic issue given that, first, China has become Aus-
tralia’s most significant two-way trading partner and, second, Australia’s 
stability and economic well-being is increasingly intertwined with neigh-
boring jurisdictions in the Asian region. Table 6 below, using official  
 
                                                 
 86. Wayne Swan, ‘Chinalco’s Acquisition Shares Rio Tinto’ (Media Release, No.094, Aug. 24, 
2008) (Austl.), available at http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/ 
2008/094.htm&pageID=003&min=wms&Year=2008&DocType=0. 
 87. Wayne Swan, ‘Foreign Investment’ (Media Release, No. 029, Mar. 27, 2009) (Austl.), 
available at   http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2009/029.htm& 
pageID=003&min=wms&Year=2009&DocType=0.  
 88. Wayne Swan, ‘Foreign Investment Decision’ (Media Release, No. 043, Apr. 23, 2009) 
(Austl.), available at http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2009/ 
043.htm&pageID=003&min=wms&Year=&DocType=.  
 89. John Kerin & Natalie Gerritsen, Curbs on State Business Stall China Deal, AUSTL. FIN. 
REV., Apr. 19, 2013, at 9. 
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Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) data, demonstrates this  
economic reality very clearly: in terms of two-way trade, China is top 
with 19.9%, followed by Japan (11.9%), the United States (8.9%), South 
Korea (5.4%), and Singapore rounds out the top five with 4.6%.
90
 










 % Share 
1. China 113.6 7.4 121.1 19.9 
2. Japan 68.4 4.0 72.5 11.9 




38.1 16.1 54.2 8.9 
4. Republic of 
Korea 
30.4 2.2 32.7 5.4 
5. Singapore 20.5 7.1 27.7 4.6 
6. United                  
Kingdom 
14.3 8.7 23.0 3.8 
7. New   
    Zealand 
15.3 6.3 21.6 3.5 
8. India 17.5 2.9 20.3 3.3 
9. Thailand 15.2 3.3 18.5 3.0 





499.1 109.1 608.2 100.0 
 
 
This Part tracks the flow and pattern of Chinese state capital in-
vestment in Australia over time, utilizing data from Australian and inter-
national sources. It demonstrates that China is an increasingly significant 
investor in Australia, albeit not the largest, and that investments are pre-
dominantly made in natural resources with emerging diversification to-
ward energy and agriculture. Moreover, data in this Part evince a particu-
lar hallmark of Chinese investment being SOE mobilization as the domi-
nant investment modality. As outlined in Part II, this modality has raised 
                                                 
 90. Trade at a Glance 2012, DEP’T FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, 6 (Oct. 2012), 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/trade/trade-at-a-glance-2012.pdf (Austl.); see also infra note 91. 
 91. Trade at a Glance 2012, supra note 90. Superscript in Table 6: (a) Recorded trade basis; 
(b) Balance of payments basis; (c) Excludes imports of aircraft from regional import total from Sep-
tember 2008 onwards (excluding the United States—see (e), which has a significant impact on im-
port totals for France); (d) Total may not sum due to rounding; (e) Based on unpublished Australian 
Bureau of Statistics data and includes confidential aircraft imports for the United States only. Id. 
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specific concerns and questions for investee nations, including Australia, 
about the motivations of investing corporations. Accordingly, this Part  
clarifies the inherent characteristics of SOEs that capture media and poli-
cy imagination, details SOE-specific investment data, and raises some 
key issues to help researchers of state capital better investigate the pur-
pose of SOE-led Chinese investment. 
A. Investment from China: Flows, Patterns, and Sectors 
This section details general Chinese investment flows and patterns 
in Australia to highlight the volume, value, and sectors of such invest-
ment, particularly in light of total and cross-comparative direct invest-
ment flows. Tracking these investment patterns shows the evolution over 
time and the growing significance of Chinese investment in Australia. 
1. FIRB: Approved Proposed Investment from China 
FIRB data provides a useful means of tracking government agency 
decision-making outcomes on foreign investment, as demonstrated be-
low. Part II outlined the role of FIRB as the federal government’s adviso-
ry body and delegated decision-making authority for specific foreign in-
vestment proposals. FIRB Annual Reports provide breakdowns of for-
eign investment applications considered and decided by value, sector, 
and investor country per fiscal year. However, these reports track only 
approved proposed investment, and proposals may not necessarily pro-
ceed to completion. Thus, FIRB data are limited as a lone tool of invest-
ment analysis and must be supplemented with further data regarding ac-
tual investments, as detailed in the next subsection. 
According to FIRB Annual Reports, approved proposed Chinese 
investment contracts from 2011–2012 comprised nearly half of the total 
number for all foreign countries, making China the largest proposed in-
vestor by contract volume (see Table 7 below).92 However, in dollar val-
ue, proposed Chinese investment into Australia during that same period 
equated to AU$16.19 billion, making China the third largest proposed 
investor to Australia behind the United States (AU$36.613 billion) and 







                                                 
 92. Annual Report 2011–12, supra note 80, at 30. 
 93. Id. 
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Table 7: FIRB Approved Proposed Investment: 2011/2012 






Total 170.71 10,703 
Top 5 Countries by  
Proposed Investment  
Value 
  
United States 36.613 268 
UK 20.343 1,018 
China 16.190 4,752 
Japan 13.920 324 
Canada 8.871 131 
 
Indeed, looking longitudinally at proposed Chinese investment pat-
terns, the value of approved proposed Chinese investment into Australia 
has risen and fallen since 2005/2006, yet China has maintained a steady 















                                                 
 94. A timeline comparison for the period 2005/2006–2011/2012 of contracts approved for 
single countries (e.g., China) is skewed by an aberrative figure in the 2008/2009 FIRB Annual Re-
port. Table 2.11 in that report lists the number of all approvals per country. The total for all approv-
als is given as 568 contracts. But then Table 2.1 in the same report lists the same total contract ap-
provals for the period as 5,352. Table 2.11 is the only FIRB table in the annual reports that gives a 
breakdown of contracts per country. The figure (in total and therefore by aggregate country) is ex-
tremely low and inconsistent with other contract numbers in the same report. See Annual Report 
2008–09, FOREIGN INVESTMENT REV. BOARD, 33 (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.firb.gov.au/content/ 
publications/annualreports/2008-2009/_downloads/2008-09_FIRB_AR.pdf. However, the figures for 
approval by value are consistent when cross-checked throughout the tables of each annual report for 
the period 2005/2006–2011/2012 (Austl.). 
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 05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 10/11 Total 
Total Approved 
Value 
85.75 156.39 191.88 181.35 139.50 176.67 1102.25 
China Approved 
Value 
7.26 2.64 7.48 26.60 16.28 14.98 91.43 
China’s % of 
Total Approval 
Value 
8.5% 1.7% 3.9% 14.7% 11.7% 8.5% 
China’s Country  
Rank by Invest-
ment Value 
3 11 6 2 3 3 
 
In terms of specific investment targets, mineral exploitation and de-
velopment has been the consistent prime locus of proposed Chinese in-
ward investment into Australia (Table 9). Proposed investment in this 
sector remains high at nearly 70% of total investment in 2011/2012, even 
though it has decreased since 2005 (despite an anomalous year in 
2006/2007 of less than 50%). Real estate is the second largest proposed 
investment target, at approximately one-quarter of total proposed Chi-
nese investment in 2011/2012.
96
 The areas of consistently least interest 
                                                 
 95. Annual Report 2005–06, FOREIGN INVESTMENT REV. BOARD (Dec. 11, 2006), 
http://www.firb.gov.au/content/publications/annualreports/2005-2006/_downloads/2005-06_FIRB 
_AR.pdf (Austl.); Annual Report 2006–07, FOREIGN INVESTMENT REV. BOARD (Mar. 14, 2008), 
http://www.firb.gov.au/content/Publications/AnnualReports/2006-2007/_downloads/2006-07_FIR 
B_AR.pdf (Austl.); Annual Report 2007–08, FOREIGN INVESTMENT REV. BOARD (July 20, 2009), 
http://www.firb.gov.au/content/Publications/AnnualReports/2007-2008/_downloads/2007-08_FIRB 
_AR.pdf (Austl.); Annual Report 2008–09, supra note 94; Annual Report 2009–10, FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT REV. BOARD (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.firb.gov.au/content/Publications/ AnnualRep 
orts/2009-2010/_downloads/2009-10_FIRB_AR.pdf (Austl.); Annual Report 2010–11, FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT REV. BOARD  (Apr. 15, 2012), http://www.firb.gov.au/content/Publications/AnnualRep 
orts/2010-2011/_downloads/2010-11_FIRB_AR.pdf (Austl.); Annual Report 2011–12, supra note 
80. 
 96. Note, however, that figures can jump between years due to policy changes in thresholds per 
sector and factors such as screening in real estate. Different sectors have different capital threshold 
levels, and proposals below sector threshold levels are not recorded. Various changes to FIRB 
threshold procedure policies over the years mean that comparability across periods using FIRB sta-
tistics can be misleading. For example, the reintroduction from April 24, 2010, of screening tempo-
rary residents purchasing residential real estate is largely responsible for the jump to 9,771 approvals 
in the real estate sector in 2010–2011, compared to 3,897 approvals in 2009–2010. Annual Report 
2011–12, supra note 80, at xi.  Furthermore, while all deal types are recorded in FIRB statistics, not 
all necessarily reflect a change in foreign ownership. In some cases, both the investor and the target 
are foreign persons. Id. at 16. Moreover, FIRB figures are based on the assumption that all invest-
ment funds will be sourced from overseas.  In reality, however, Australians may contribute some 
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for proposed Chinese investment are tourism; resource processing; agri-
culture, forestry, and fishing; and finance and insurance. 




SECTOR 05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 10/11 11/12 
Agriculture, forestry 
& fishing  
- 0.57 - - - 0.03 0.17 
Finance and  
Insurance 
- - 5.62 0.16 - 3.73 0.37 
Manufacturing 3.10 26.5 - 0.31 1.22 2.78 3.32 
Mineral exploitation 
& development 
93.10 45.57 71 98.70 78.84 65.16 64.90 
Real Estate 3.80 26.97 19.94 - 14.87 27.44 25.86 
Resource  
Processing 
- - 1.83 0.61 4.67 0.88 1.48 
Services - 0.38 1.35 0.20 4.40 0.11 3.92 
Tourism - 0.04 0.27 0.02 - - - 
2. Actual Investment Flows from China 
Proposed investment flows, as documented above, give a good 
snapshot of FIRB approvals/decision-making outcomes and projected 
investment patterns. However, proposed investment data does not accu-
rately reflect the investment environment in real terms. For example, 
from January 1, 2006, to December 31, 2012, Australian Bureau of Sta-
tistics’ (ABS) figures provide that total actual Chinese investment into 
Australia equaled AU$57.3 billion (Table 12 below),
98
 which is a very 
different figure to FIRB’s total approved proposed investment of 
AU$91.4 billion (Table 8 above).
99
 More specifically, for that same peri-
od, 196 Chinese investments were announced in the energy and re-
sources sectors, amounting to a proposed value of AU$100.7 billion.100 
However, 83% of those deals were completed, which equates to actual 
investment into Australian mining and energy worth AU$50.4 bil-
                                                                                                             
funds, for example, where they are in partnership with foreign interests or where the investment is 
financed from existing Australian operations. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. International Investment Position, Australia: Supplementary Statistics, AUSTL. BUREAU 
STAT., tbl.2 (May 2, 2013), http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/5352.02012? 
OpenDocument. 
 99. See supra Table 8 and sources cited supra note 95. 
 100. CLAYTON UTZ, DIGGING DEEP: CHINESE INVESTMENT IN AUSTRALIAN ENERGY AND 
RESOURCES 8 (2013). 
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lion
101
—that is, around half of the proposed figure. Accordingly, actual 
investment data rather than proposed investment figures provide a more 
reliable evidentiary basis for analysis and discussion of Chinese invest-
ment into Australia. 
Australia is currently the top destination for actual Chinese invest-
ment, narrowly ahead of the United States (Table 10 below).
102
 However, 
while Australia is the largest recipient of Chinese FDI, China is not Aus-
tralia’s largest investor (Table 11 below).
103
 The ABS data for the calen-
dar year periods from 2006 to 2012 show that accumulated actual direct 
investment in Australia from the United States equated to AU$747 bil-
lion, being a 24% share of Australia’s total foreign direct investment 
stock. This compares strikingly to China’s direct investment for that 
same period which equated to only AU$57.3 billion or 2% share of the 
total. Accordingly, by the end of 2012, China was Australia’s ninth larg-
est direct investor, which may be lower than that assumed by many in the 




Table 10: Accumulated Chinese Investment by Country for Deals Above 
US$100 million: January 1, 2005–December 31, 2012 (US$ millions) 
 
 
                                                 
 101. Id. Clayton Utz’s data comprises only the energy and resources sectors, which includes 
renewables but excludes power generation. Id. at 28. 
 102. China Global Investment Tracker Interactive Map, HERITAGE FOUNDATION (2013), 
http://www.heritage.org/research/projects/china-global-investment-tracker-interactive-map; see also 
KPMG 2013, supra note 11, at 2. 
 103. See AUSTL. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, supra note 98. 
 104. Indeed, Clayton Utz asserts that the value of completed Chinese investment in mining and 
energy sectors would “likely amount to considerably less than 10%” of the total value of resources 
and energy projects in Australia. UTZ, supra note 100, at 9. 
Australi
a
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Table 11: Accumulated Chinese Investment by Country for Deals Above 
US$100 million: January 1, 2005–December 31, 2005 (US$ Million) 
 
Top Countries Value Percentage of Total Investor Ranking 
United States 746,792 24.1% 1 
United Kingdom 443,804 14.3% 2 
Japan 303,638 9.8% 3 
Netherlands 196,334 6.3% 4 
Switzerland 136,602 4.4% 5 
China (excluding 
SARs & Taiwan) 
57,340 1.9% 9 
Hong Kong (China 
SAR) 






Nonetheless, Table 12 below reveals the pattern of actual Chinese 
investment in Australia over the six-year period from 2006 to 2012: It 
shows that investment has increased significantly year after year.
105
 This 
increase is partly due to resurging energy and metals investments,
106
 and 
while natural resources and mining sector investments dominate, Chinese 
investment in Australia is diversifying towards energy (gas and renewa-
bles) and agriculture (Table 13 below).
107
 
Table 12: Chinese Investment in Australia:                                          
January 1, 2006–December 31, 2012 (AU$ millions) 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
550 Not pub-
lished 





                                                 
 105. AUSTL. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, supra note 98. 
 106. HERITAGE FOUNDATION, supra note 102. 
 107. KPMG 2013, supra note 11, at 6–7, 12–13. Note that KPMG data comprises deals valued 
US$5 million and above, hence the slight disparity in total value 2006–2012 between ABS and 
KPMG figures. Also, figures are not exact because agriculture sectoral investment for South Austral-
ia is not specified in the report. 
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Table 13: Chinese Investment in Australia by Industry of Deals Above 
US$5 million: September 2006–December 2012 vs. 2012 (US$ millions) 
 
2006–2012 2012 
By volume By value By volume By value 
Mining 73% $36,874.95 48% $5,471.46 
Gas 18% $8,867.01 42% $4,785.20 
Renewable 
energy 
4% $2,212.60 2% $182.60 
Agriculture >2%* >$843.16* 2.6% $182.60 
Other (e.g., logistic 
equipment & services; 
finance; architecture) 
<3%* <$1994.16* 5.4% $919.64 
Total 100% $50, 791.88 100% $11,383.46 
 
Indeed, patterns of investment diversification are evidenced over 
time. According to the Heritage Foundation, forty-six Chinese invest-
ment deals valued above US$100 million were completed in Australia 
during the last seven years.
108
 Of this number, deals in the steel and alu-
minum industries occurred only during 2005–2009;
109
 energy deals in the 
gas and coal industries commenced from 2008 and 2007 respectively.
110
 
These investment patterns correspond to a number of external eco-
nomic and internal Chinese policy factors. The 2008–2009 period 
marked the financial vulnerability of Australian companies due to the 
GFC and also China’s increased domestic measures to stimulate its 
economy.
111
 It is not surprising that, during this period, China completed 
96% of announced energy and resources deals; however, as the GFC re-
ceded, the completion rate dropped markedly to only 22%.
112
 Moreover, 
the diversification away from mining toward energy reflects an increased 
global demand for liquefied natural gas (LNG) in conjunction with Chi-
na’s plan to diversify its energy consumption structure beyond coal.
113
 
Further, aall large agriculture deals occurred only in the past two years
114
 
                                                 
 108. HERITAGE FOUNDATION, supra note 102. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id.; see also UTZ, supra note 100, at 12. 
 111. UTZ, supra note 100, at 12. 
 112. Id. at 9. 
 113. KPMG 2013, supra note 11, at 9. 
 114. HERITAGE FOUNDATION, supra note 102. 
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with increasing Chinese investment in Australian agriculture and real 
estate sectors predicted for 2013.
115
 
B. Primary Modality of Chinese Investment: SOEs 
The preceding section showed that actual Chinese investments are 
being made predominantly in mining and natural resources sectors with 
diversification emerging toward energy and agricultural sectors. But how 
and by whom are these investments being made? The data indicate that a 
notable aspect of Chinese FDI is the mobilization of SOEs as China’s 
preferred investment modality. 
The data clearly show that SOE-led investments dominate the Sino-
–Australian investment landscape. According to recent KPMG reports, 
total Chinese inward investment (valued at US$5 million and above) to 
Australia from the period of September 2006 to June 2012 comprised 
116 deals by volume of which nearly 80% were made by 45 SOEs; over 
95% of deal value involved SOEs during this same timeframe (Table 14 
below).
116
 Those percentages are notably higher than average SOE in-
vestment figures of deal value in the United States (65%) and Europe 
(72%).
117
 More specifically, in the Australian mining and energy sectors, 
Clayton Utz reports that for the slightly longer period of January 2005 to 
December 2012, SOEs accounted for 76% of deal volume, 100% of all 





Table 14: Chinese Investment into Australia:                                       




                                                 
 115. KPMG 2012, supra note 17, at 18. 
 116. Id. at 9. In 2012 alone, SOEs completed 74% of all deals (valued at US$5 million and 
above) by volume and 87% by deal value of the total Chinese inward investment into Australia: 
KPMG 2013, supra note 103, at 1. Note, however, that the KPMG reports do not reveal original 
sources of their SOE figures. 
 117. See Daniel H. Rosen & Thilo Hanemann, An American Open Door? Maximizing the 
Benefits of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment, ASIA SOC’Y, 33 (May 4, 2011), http://www.ogilvy 
pr.com/files/anamericanopendoor_china_fdi_study.pdf (noting that SOE investment in the U.S. by 
deal volume is much less at 26%); Thilo Hanemann & Daniel H. Rosen, China Invests in Europe: 
Patterns, Impacts and Policy Implications, RHODIUM GRP., 4, 45 (June 7, 2012), http://rhg.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/RHG_ChinaInvestsInEurope_June2012pdf (noting that SOE investment in 
Europe by deal volume is only 33%). Chinese statistics of SOE-led outward foreign investment is 
approximately 70%. 2010 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 
MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA  (Sept. 16, 2011), http://english.mofcom.g 
ov.cn/article/statistic/foreigninvestment/201109/20110907742320.shtml. 
 118. UTZ, supra note 100, at 4. 
 119. KPMG 2013, supra note 11, at 1, 15. 
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2006–2012 2012 
By volume By deal value By volume By deal value 
SOE share of 
capital invested 
80% 94% 74% 87% 
Private (non-
state) investment 
20% 6% 26% 13% 
 
The above figures reflect two key factors: First, traditional areas of 
investment concern for SOEs are mining, energy, and resources; second, 
Australia has a relative abundance of natural resources, giving it a com-
parative advantage as an investment destination in these sectors. 
Moreover, the SOE investment figures in Australia echo the mo-
mentum of SOE-led investment from emerging economies throughout 
the world as depicted in Part I. Yet this strong SOE capitalization and 
mobilization has instigated concern within some Anglo-American na-
tions about SOE acquisition in contrast to other investment modalities. 
Concerns about one state owning another state’s key resources or assets 
through strategic SOE corporate activity is not new; however, concerns 
have manifested recently due to the confluence of two phenomena out-
lined in Parts I and II: (1) the vulnerability of some Western economies 
and the legitimacy crisis of liberal capitalism post-GFC; and (2) the rise 
of state-led capital in emerging economies that are now beginning to 
look outward. These concerns center upon perceptions of risk to national 
security, energy security, and economic security (control over wealth-
creating assets).
120
 Additionally or alternatively, these concerns center 
upon fear of the other.
121
 
Part II demonstrated that foreign investment, politics, and populism 
are increasingly linked in recent times. Nowhere is this more evident 
than in relation to SOE-directed foreign investment. The intrinsic nature 
of an SOE seems to capture media sensationalism and influence public  
discourse and policy. For example, recent media headlines in Australia 
include, “China’s State-Owned Enterprises Obtain FIRB Approval by 
Stealth,”
122
 and “Don’t Mix Politics and Deals: FIRB in Warning to 
                                                 
 120. See, e.g., Luke Hurst, Peter Yuan Cai & Christopher Findlay, Chinese Direct Investment 
in Australia: Public Reaction, Policy Response, Investor Adaptation (E. Asian Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 81, 2012), available at http://www.eaber.org/sites/default/files/docu 
ments/Chinese%20direct%20investment%20in%20Australia%20-%20By%20Luke%20Hurst,%20 
Peter%20Yuan%20Cai%20and%20Cristopher%20Findlay.pdf; Howson, supra note 16. 
 121. See, e.g., Hurst, Yuan Cai & Findlay, supra note 120. 
 122. Bryan Frith, China’s State-Owned Enterprises Obtain FIRB Approval by Stealth, 
AUSTRALIAN (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/opinion/chinas-state-
owned-enterprises-obtain-firb-approval-by-stealth/story-e6frg9kx-1226595937750. 
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State-Owned Investors.”
123
  FIRB did, in fact, amend Australia’s Foreign 
Investment Policy on March 4, 2013, to extend the concept of direct in-
vestments of less than 10% to cover scenarios in which investor consor-
tia that include foreign investors may be amassing strategic stakes in tar-
get investments.
124
 Yet concern is not limited to Australia. For example, 
the revised Canadian investment policy guidelines to the Investment 
Canada Act provide explicitly, “[I]nvestors will be expected to address[,] 
in their plans and undertakings, the inherent characteristics of SOEs, 
specifically that they are susceptible to state influence,”125 and entities 
that are “owned, controlled or influenced, directly or indirectly by a for-
eign government” must satisfy the Canadian Minister of Industry that the 
project is commercial and free from political influence.
126
 Similarly, po-
litical decisions are not immune, as illustrated by the Australian govern-
ment’s exclusion of Huawei from the National Broadband Network bid-
ding based on security concerns in 2012
127
 and President Barack 
Obama’s Executive Order to prohibit Ralls Corporation from owning 
several wind farm projects in Oregon in 2013 for similar reasons.
128
 
But why is there such concern about SOE-led investment over and 





 give valuable insight into the multi-faceted dimensions of 
Chinese SOEs and how they link into the shifting political economy of 
center-province and intra-province relations. The traditional Chinese 
SOE was an organizational form, not a legal form. The economic re-
forms from the 1970s first took place in rural China, whereby the agri-
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Ralls Corporation is controlled by two executives of Sany Heavy Industry Co. Ltd., a Chinese multi-
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Ewing-Chow eds., 2012). 
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cultural industry was decentralized to local governments, and commer-
cial “township and village enterprises” (TVEs) emerged as an early form 
of SOEs. Thus, historically, state players in SOE control were local or 
provincial governments, not central agencies.
131
 Moreover, an SOE did 
not have separate legal personality nor issue stock or equity (ownership) 
in itself; instead, it was administratively controlled by the state, which 
had the right to appoint management and appropriate revenues or profits. 
One can therefore assume that an SOE’s original raison d’etre was to 
pursue state purposes as opposed to market freedoms; yet to what pur-
pose remains clouded. 
Since commencement of the Chinese corporatization program, as 
expressed in the 1994 Company Law and 2006 PRC Company law, Chi-
nese companies can take one of three legal forms: (i) a company limited 
by shares (CLS); (ii) a company limited by liability (LLC); or (iii) a 
company wholly owned by a state agency (WSOC). However, Clarke 
and Howson are clear that this legal process has not resulted in wide-
spread private corporate ownership; rather, Chinese companies are now 
corporatized, not privatized.
132
 Indeed, an SOE is now administratively 
and financially controlled by an entity of the state (central or local). 
Whereas in the United States or Australia, for example, that entity would 
more likely be owned by private institutional investors. Consequently, a 
controlling shareholder of an SOE in China has political as well as eco-
nomic dominance, which has important implications for the nature of a 
state-controlled corporation and who it seeks to serve. 
Yet, is there a documented cause for the type of concerns that have 
manifested in media and policy circles? SOE-specific data, over and 
above data about general Chinese investment flows and patterns as de-
picted in Part III.A, are required to accurately answer this question. 
FIRB Annual Reports for 2005/06 through 2011/12 do not differen-
tiate between SOE and non-SOE investments in Australia (whether from 
China or elsewhere). Thus, SOE-specific information must be extracted 
from multiple other sources such as government agency sources, for ex-
ample, ABS, DFAT, Ministry of Commerce of the Republic of China 
(MOFCOM), China State Asset Supervision and Administration 
(SASAC), and the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS), as well 
as industry sources such as Clayton Utz solicitors, KPMG, and The Her-
itage Foundation. 
It is important to note that, at the outset, these different datasets are 
not easily compared due to a number of differences between the sources 
                                                 
 131. Id. at 60–107. 
 132. Clarke & Howson, supra note 129, at 245–49. 







 and compilation 
methodology.
136
 Being mindful of disparities between data collection 
methods enables more accurate SOE investigation. 
Traditionally, SOEs by their nature have tended to invest in areas of 
nationwide priority: natural resources, utilities, telecommunication ser-
vices, and defense. However, Lee specifies that Chinese SOEs now oper-
ate in all major sectors except export manufacturing: 
[E]very important sector in the economy—from commodities, utili-
ties, chemicals and heavy industry to infrastructure, construction 
and shipping, to banking, finance and insurance, to media and edu-
cation, to renewable, information technology (IT) and advanced IT 
platforms and technologies—these are SOE-dominated.
137
 
Moreover, economists Marchick and Bowles note that privately-
held companies are populating the Chinese economy; however, most of 
these companies are very small and lack the wherewithal to invest heavi-
ly overseas.
138
 Certainly, private enterprises have not accounted for any 
energy or resources investments in Australia above AU$250 million.
139
 
Further, Lee evidences that SOEs comprise 950 of the 1,000 largest firms 
in China, and all but 100 of the 2,037 firms listed on the stock exchange 
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in 2012 were SOEs.
140
 These empirical realities place SOEs at the heart 
of not only China’s economy but also the social, political (including for-
eign policy), and cultural infrastructures that depend upon that economic 
substructure. 
Table 15 below identifies the ten largest Chinese corporate inves-
tors in Australia, which all happen to be SOEs. These ten SOEs account-
ed for US$39 billion out of a total accumulated direct investment of 
US$51 billion for January 2005 to December 2012, which equates to 




Table 15: Largest Investors in Australia:                                              
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The central government has over 50% control of the vast majority 
of these SOEs. Only one firm in the top ten largest Chinese investors, 
Yanzhou Coal, is a local SOE (Shandong). As such, we can infer that any 
high-value investment by a large Chinese firm in Australia is being made 
via an SOE whose majority shareholder is a central state entity. 
C. Chinese Investment or ‘China Incorporated’? 
The largest Chinese investors in Australia are SOEs and their sec-
toral investment continues to focus on resources, particularly in metals 
and mining. However, investment is diversifying into energy, particular-
ly gas, as well as food production. These sectors clearly represent Chi-
na’s national interest in supporting a rapidly urbanizing population that 
exceeds indigenous resources on a per capita basis. 
Yet, one challenge for commentators of state capital is to discern 
and appreciate the impacts on foreign investment of intra-China ten-
sions— first, between the goals of central and provincial state entities 
and second, between the goals of central state actors and SOE boards. On 
the first point, Ruskola’s depiction of local, not central, government ac-
tors as germane to the commercial success of traditional TVEs and SOEs 
is relevant. Fragmentation of SOE ownership and thus potentially com-
peting priorities between levels of government add internal complexity to 
SOE investment behavior. However, nine out of ten of the current largest 
Chinese corporate investors in Australia are central government-
controlled SOEs. Therefore, such complexity is less compelling in this 
jurisdiction. 
On the second point, SOEs may be exercising independence from 
the government entities that formally own or control them. The State-
Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) 
provides the operating framework for SOEs. In March 2012, SASAC 
issued new regulations requiring central state-controlled SOEs to do the 
following: register with SASAC before undertaking “key investment pro-
jects” in their core businesses; obtain SASAC approval prior to investing 
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overseas in non-core areas of business; and lodge details with SASAC of 
sources of investment and financing for proposed non-core area invest-
ments.
144
 Despite the SASAC framework, there is some evidence to sug-
gest that the “Going Out” strategy is being led by Chinese firms rather 
than central government. The Peterson Institute for International Econo-
mies asserts that SOEs operate and make investment decisions not as 
agents of the state but similar to any other corporation.
145
 Howson makes 
a similar claim, citing the action of CNOOC Ltd. in bidding for Unocal 
in 2005 despite central government opposition.
146
 Similarly, KPMG ar-
gues that Chinese SOEs abroad have shown strong commercial motiva-
tions, similar to those of multinational corporations from developed 
countries.
147
 Commercial motivations are evinced by SOE capital in-
vestments to secure stable and high-quality supplies of natural resources, 
and mergers and acquisitions to acquire new brands and technology, ac-
cessing new markets and exporting Chinese brands. 
Moreover, multiple external parties are involved in Chinese SOE 
investment decision making abroad, including domestic consultants, cor-
porate partners, and financiers such that decisions cannot be made solely 
by a government entity. Importantly, statistics show that Chinese inves-
tors rely heavily on local talent to manage Australian companies in 
which the investor gains a controlling interest. For example, during the 
period from January 1, 2005, to December 31, 2012, Chinese nationals 
were appointed as chief executive officer in only 32% of acquisitions in 
the energy and resources sectors and as chief operating officer in only 
10% of the same.
148
 
This evidence gives rational cause to seriously question a “China 
Inc.” central domination strategy as sensationalized in Western media 
and feared by politicians. Specifically, the data detailed and discussed 
above show the following: China is an increasingly significant investor 
in Australia but not the largest investor; Chinese investments are occur-
ring predominantly in mining and natural resources with emerging diver-
sification toward energy and agriculture; and corporate control of ac-
quired companies tends to remain with local actors. Thus, one can make 
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a compelling argument that China is behaving like a nation that seeks to 
secure resources, energy, and food for growing domestic demand that 
will soon far exceed domestic supply as opposed to embodying a politi-
cally charged and malevolent avarice. Certainly, the data evidence that 
SOEs are the primary modality of Chinese investment in Australia and 
that the largest Chinese investors are central government-controlled. 
However, these SOEs appear to be pursuing commercial opportunities in 
source-rich foreign jurisdictions in much the same way as Western mul-
tinational corporations have done abroad and continue to do so. 
Concrete conclusions about the intent of Chinese governments and 
their corporate champions as investors in foreign jurisdictions can only 
be formed after further empirical investigation. Thus far, however, the 
data tend to indicate that media and policy concerns have been over-
played in Australia. Given the growing importance of Chinese trade with 
and investment in Australia, and Australia’s need to retain competitive 
advantage in the region for the long-term, pursuing evidence-based con-
clusions ought to be a priority of national interest. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In a post-GFC world, as the twenty-first century progresses and the 
economic power of certain Asian countries grows, market perceptions 
about appropriate levels of activity by the state as an investor in capital 
markets may well change. These changes are likely to reflect trends in 
the composition of the global economy and projections regarding which 
nations will be losers and winners. In recent years, Australia has been a 
winner. However, given the extent to which Australia’s economic well-
being is tied to China’s future growth, determining how to manage in-
ward capital investment, particularly from state pools of capital, has sig-
nificant corporate, legal, and policy implications. 
The May 2013 release of Energy in Australia, by the Common-
wealth Government’s Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics 
(BREE), fueled the debate about whether Australia’s so-called “re-
sources boom” has peaked.
149
 The BREE is the key forecaster on com-
modities for the federal government, and it delivered a number of chilly 
messages on the near-term projections for Australia’s resources and en-
ergy sector, despite the current rosy picture. For example, on the plus 
side, Australia’s energy sector accounts for 6% of Australia’s total indus-
try value and has provided $77 billion of energy exports in 2011–2012; 
currently, it has committed and potential projects totaling $350 billion 
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(approximately 18% of GDP). However, on the negative side, the value 
of committed and potential projects is expected to fall to $25 billion in 
2018. This dramatic downturn has already been signaled during the last 
year by the setting aside of $150 billion in energy and mining projects 
including Aquila’s West Pilbara iron ore mine in Western Australia, 
BHP’s Olympic Dam expansion in South Australia, and Woodside Petro-
leum’s Browse LNG project in Western Australia. The bad news con-
cerning shelved projects such as these is amplified by revelations of cost 
blowouts of more than $29 billion regarding existing projects. A 96% fall 
in large-scale investment in energy and resources in only five years is a 
massive slide and prompted a flurry of headlines proclaiming that Aus-
tralia’s resources boom has indeed ended.
150
 
These gloomy statistics may be preemptively negative; time will 
tell. However, it is certain that Australia will remain a net importer of 
capital in a world in which competition for that investment dollar is in-
creasing from many countries. How much the twin pressures of increased 
investment capital competition and Australia’s seemingly reduced attrac-
tiveness as a target for that inward investment capital will impact upon 
the realpolitik of Australia’s foreign investment regulatory regime over 
the coming years is unknown. Nonetheless, the inevitable political influ-
ence on that investment regime was clear in the June 2013 final report of 
the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Committee, which 
had a particular focus on foreign investment into Australian agricul-
ture.
151
 The Committee made twenty-nine general recommendations and 
highlighted the limitations of FATA in a contemporary investment set-
ting.
152
 The Committee’s key findings and recommendations included the 
following: there is a significant lack of detailed and accurate information 
regarding foreign investment in the Australian agricultural sector; there 
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are significant shortcomings in the transparency of the FIRB process and 
in the scrutiny of the national interest test; the current investment thresh-
old of AU$248 million to trigger a FIRB review of proposed private for-
eign investments in the agriculture industry is far too high; and there are 
problems with current legislative definitions of “rural land,” “urban 
land,” and “direct investment.” Importantly, the Committee recommend-
ed certain steps that the federal government ought to take to develop a 
more rigorous and transparent system for examining cases of foreign ag-
ricultural investment in Australia. The Committee recommended estab-
lishing an Independent Commission of Audit into Agribusiness to devel-
op a comprehensive policy approach to Australian agriculture investment 
and creating a national register for foreign ownership of agricultural land 
as the primary mechanism for collecting and publishing information 
about such foreign investment. Specifically, the Committee recommend-
ed forensic examination of company structures (including management 
relationships in joint Australian–foreign ventures); the relationship be-
tween a foreign government’s acquisitions strategy (such as food securi-
ty) and the commercial operation of their subsidiary businesses in Aus-
tralia; and ways of setting clear and auditable ongoing undertakings that 
are in the “national interest.” 
This paper has examined many of the factors that underpin debates 
on these specific issues and foreign investment in general. In particular, 
the paper has focused on the increasingly strategic role that state capital 
is likely to play in global and Australian contexts. Therefore, it is vital 
that national and international policy development in this area is under-
pinned by accurate data, as stressed by the Senate Committee in relation 
to foreign investment in Australian agriculture. The discussion on the 
methodological difficulties associated with evaluating the extent and im-
pact of investment by state capital actors illustrates that it will be a chal-
lenging yet essential process to chart these developments. 
 
